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Abstract
Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts,
and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and
operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional
rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through
precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a
series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a
right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of
the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political
histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of
service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind),
which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation
of a constitutional right.
Key words
Emotions; law and emotions; judging; legal reasoning; constitutional rights
Resumen
El razonamiento jurídico en la tradición de derecho consuetudinario exige que los
jueces partan de conceptos y de ejemplos que se supone se hacen eco de un
significado emocional concreto y que, en el razonamiento judicial, operan como si de
hecho así fuera. La aplicación judicial de derechos constitucionales se interpreta
generalmente por medio de referencias a delitos anteriores (a través de encuadres
contextuales precedentes o bien a través de la historia legislativa), lo que, a su vez,
invoca una serie de emociones que profundizan e intensifican la interpretación judicial
de una garantía jurídica (libertad de asociación, libertad de expresión, igualdad,
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seguridad de la persona, etc.). Este artículo analiza la forma en que las invocaciones
a la historia política o a abusos de derechos (por mal o bien definidos que estén)
sirven para formar un conjunto de emociones de servicio (que sirven para establecer
un estado de ánimo concreto), que guían la aplicación judicial de la doctrina en casos
de presuntas violaciones de derechos constitucionales.
Palabras clave
Emociones; derecho
constitucionales
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1. Introduction
While the ideal of the dispassionate judge reflects an important set of normative
commitments that track widely across differing approaches to the study of law, it
ultimately rests upon an account of law and the judicial role that remains only
surface-level true. Judges have distinct role-related reasons for conscientiously
drawing on certain emotions, or even cultivating certain affective dispositions which
flow both from the governing legal doctrine (Bandes 1996, 1999, Gardner 2008,
White 2014), and more generally, from the serious and solemn task of judicial
reasoning, and judicial decision-making.
Political histories and past right abuses are regularly invoked in common law legal
reasoning, through precedent and/or legislative history, to establish the purposes
and purview of an impugned constitutional right. This paper analyzes the work of
emotions in judicial invocations of historical rights violations and, in so doing, it puts
pressure on the assumption that judges must altogether exclude, extirpate, or quiet
emotions to reason through a case. The paper concludes that while governing law
requires judges to expel certain extraneous emotions (inappropriate, pernicious, or
distracting ones, for example), it also regularly requires them to draw on (often highly
particularized) emotionally-laden examples that work to set the course of the legal
reasoning required by the case at bar (see Del Mar 2013). Though the paper draws
on the methods of analytical philosophy, its focus places the work in useful
conversation with those sociologists, psychologists, and socio-legal scholars who
work on questions concerning emotional regulation (see Gross 2014, Roach Anleu
and Mack 2017, Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018). These methods and
perspectives focus on the relationships between social roles and expectations,
emotion and motivation, emotion work, and emotional performance. This paper
supports these inquiries by drawing on philosophical methods to analyze how legal
doctrine (see Maroney 2006) requires judges to use (or in other terms, “regulate”)
emotions and emotional states in the course of legal reasoning. Whether or not we
have the ability to test the authenticity – whatever that might mean – of judicial
emotions – it is clear that governing doctrine and practices of legal reasoning within
a legal system can themselves demand a great deal of emotional thinking from judges
(see Maroney 2006). While emotions can support legal reasoning by playing
pragmatic and motivational roles, they can also play constitutive roles forming part
of the intended understanding and use of a legal concept. In the context of
constitutional reasoning, the absence of certain emotions might signify a failed
application of the governing law, or, for example, a failed understanding of the
purposes, significance, and/or reach of a constitutional rights guarantee.
As this inquiry aims to work from doctrine, it finds itself embedded within a series of
long-running jurisprudential debates on the scope, practice, grounds, and
hermeneutics of legal interpretation. As such, a few preliminary distinctions clear
ground for the analytical work that the paper is pursuing. First, what ethics, and good
politics requires can be radically distinct from the established or authorized forms of
legal reasoning within a political community. Evaluative legal concepts require judges
to adopt affectively rich understandings of certain legal objects, subjects, actions,
and events in their reasoning efforts (White, forthcoming). Governing law requires
judges to confront these legal objects, subjects, actions, and events in a particular
tone, and/or emotional register. Emotions contain evaluative judgements, and we
can weigh them ethically, and politically (see Bedford 1956, Solomon 1977b, 2003,
Nussbaum 2001, Deigh 2008). While some have contemplated a category of moral
emotions (like compassion; see Haidt 2003) that maintain their moral features across
context, the view here is that emotions are never in themselves moral or morally
beneficial, but that they have the potential to play constitutive roles with respect to
ethical action when they are felt aptly, and in the appropriate circumstances (see
Gardner 2008, White forthcoming). The emotions required by legal reasoning might
at times overlap, make good on (law might make certain emotions, or more broadly,
certain ethical activity possible), or echo real normative commitments, but this
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question of convergence is always separate and distinct. As it will be argued, it is
especially important to keep the question alive, given that the service emotions that
play constitutive roles in legal reasoning claim the status and authority of moral
emotions (and reasons; see Raz 1979) as they work to establish emotionally-laden
ways of seeing and reasoning about legal objects, subjects, actions, and events.
There is a political economy to this, and it will be a question of justice, or fairness,
or political recognition whether or not governing law does this well or poorly (we
might condemn, for example, from the perspective of justice a legal system which
imbued little emotional weight or import to the legal category of the non-citizen or
the refugee). At times, the evaluative legal concepts (such as equality, security,
liberty) that feature regularly in constitutional legal orders invite expansive, and
principle-based purposive reasoning into judicial determinations of the purview of a
right, for example. While evaluative legal concepts offer foothold for weaving (a more
explicit category of) normative considerations into legal reasoning, the practice
nevertheless retains a distinctive form (see MacCormick 1978) even in the face of
practical disagreement. Put another way, while there is some potential for the
emotions that form part of the application of certain evaluative legal concepts to push
towards more just or inclusive judicial interpretations of existing doctrine, this is not
an inevitable feature. Emotions in judicial reasoning, even when they are required by
legal doctrine, can work counter many of our political and normative commitments,
including those which overlap with fundamental legal values, to equality before the
law, for example (see Bandes 2016).
Second, the paper draws on the tools of analytical philosophy to work out the
emotional elements of certain practices of legal reasoning, and, as such, is distinct
from an inquiry into our ability to access the sincere-or-not mental states of judges,
and so too, sociological research on the expressive or performative aspects of judicial
behavior (see Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018).
Third, and last, it should be recognized that judicial references to past rights abuses
through legislative history and precedent can be deeply problematic from an ethical
or political standpoint. They can be maliciously false, tragically under-inclusive,
superficial, one-sided, etc. The law has long failed to recognize, or recognize in any
substantive way, countless histories and structural forms of political violence. There
is a political economy to what doctrine requires from the emotions of judges.
2. Drawing on Emotions; Emotions in the Service Role
I memorized the tricks to set the river on fire –
Robert Lowell, Reading Myself, 1973

Emotions have affective and cognitive states that relate closely to one another
(Solomon 1977b, 2003, Leighton 1985, 2003, Nussbaum 2001). Emotions involve a
judgment or evaluation of importance about an object or an event, and an affective
or physiological aspect (that can be broadly characterized as a pain or a pleasure),
which works to establish their constituent desire for action (Gardner 2008), and,
ultimately, differentiates them from other modes of thought or experience (Robinson
2005). While there are several ways in which emotions interact with law (see Bandes
1999, Sanger 2001, Maroney 2006, 2011, Abrams and Keren 2010) the focus here
is on the various roles that emotions play in legal reasoning. A standard assumption
is that emotions always present in the form of a reaction – that is, a person responds
with an emotion to persons, or events occurring in the world. In terms of judicial
reasoning, the dominant frame is to think of a judge responding with emotion to the
testimony, or evidence in a case, to the figure of the claimant, or even to legal
processes themselves (frustration over a delay, for example, White 2014). This is,
however, but one way in which emotions play a role in judicial reasoning (White
forthcoming). This paper looks past this dominant view to explore one instance where
actors, in this case – judges, draw on emotions to put themselves into a particular
emotional frame for the purposes of reasoning in line with the governing doctrine. It
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distinguishes between two distinct sets of reasons why judges might draw on
emotions. Judges might draw on emotions for reasons of appropriateness, having
considered that certain emotions, and emotional states are part of the right
understanding and application of certain legal concepts. Conversely, judges might
draw on particular emotions because they understand them to be productive and/or
useful in some way. An emotion might be, for example, especially motivating
(revenge, honour) or, it might play positive epistemic roles by gripping and focusing
the attention (Brady 2013) of the presiding judge or judicial panel, thereby prompting
reevaluations of the purview of the impugned right, for example.
In our daily lives, we regularly draw on emotions to help us generate the appropriate
quality of mind to act or reason in accordance with a held value (or one prescribed
to us via a role, practice, or a relationship). Elsewhere, I have termed this a service
role that some emotions sometimes fulfill (White 2014). This role or function is named
after the service beliefs that help constitute the emotion in question. In contrast with
tracking beliefs, service beliefs “do not relate world to mind at all. They are reasons
to adapt (or preserve) the way things are (including aspects of ourselves) in the
service of value” (Gardner 2008). Emotions fulfill service functions when their
constituent beliefs aim to serve a value (others have drawn on the terminology of
practical reasons) (Gardner 2008). It is often the case that we try to exclude or
temper certain emotions to act in accordance with a value. In a similar vein, we may
also try to put ourselves in a position to experience an emotion because we
understand it to be called for or appropriate. Forms and practices of emotional
regulation have been studied in the psychological literature (see Gross 2014). In the
philosophy of emotion, it has been recognized since at least Aristotle’s time that
emotional states of mind can be scrutinized, displaced, or fine-tuned, and, they can,
at times, also be conjured up, which is our focus here.
Underscoring the epistemic benefits of emotions in the service role effectively
undermines the Kantian view of emotions, which, as summarized by Bernard
Williams, sees emotions as “capricious”, “passive”, and, as the “product of natural
causation”, “fortuitously distributed” (Williams 1973). This Kantian view implies “that
there is no way of adjusting one’s emotional response in the light of other
considerations, of applying some sense of proportion, without abandoning emotional
motivation altogether.” (Williams 1973). The Kantian view requires revision,
especially when we consider our emotional reactions as occurring over time. While it
may be difficult to draw on emotions to alter our experience of the world, it is also
possible, and, at times, ethically, politically, or practically required (Solomon 2003). 1
We regularly revise our emotional responses by focusing on the object of concern
and pressing ourselves to see whether our response was appropriate, for “as the
phenomenologists have constantly stressed, to feel a certain emotion towards a given
object is to see it in a certain light; it may be wrong, incorrect, inappropriate to see
it in that light, and I may become convinced of this” (Williams 1973). This is not to
say, however, that such processing always operates to mute or quiet an emotion.
Appropriate emotions are not always moderate or tepid ones (Aristotle 1984) 2 and
revision can, at times, have an intensifying effect. We do this sort of work by putting
pressure on our judgments, setting up habits of mind or body (everyone feels better
after a swim), calling up competing emotions, or using our imagination. As Bernard
Williams writes,

Solomon’s core theses: 1) that we are responsible to some extent for our emotions, and 2) that emotions
themselves are cognitive judgments and not simply feelings (although they will, of course, relate closely
to feelings and physiological reactions).
2
Strong emotions are sometimes precisely what are called for under certain circumstances. We also
needn’t rely too heavily on the notion of control. We might think of some human losses as so jarring, for
example, that debilitating grief rightly follows. See, for example, Francine Prose’s examination of selfforgiveness in her review of the 2017 film Manchester By the Sea (Prose 2016). We might think of a host
of examples where emotions overwhelm us without ever exceeding the bounds of appropriateness.
1
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Of course, it may be that no thoughts about the object shift the emotion; because
they fail to convince (which, notoriously enough, may be a function of the emotion
itself) or because, although they in a way convince, the emotional structure persists.
The phenomenology, psychology and indeed the logic, of such situations is highly
complex and various. But the important point now is this: that when considerations
which show the emotion to be inappropriate fail to displace it, this is not because it
is an emotion, but because it is an irrational emotion. (Williams 1973)

Similarly, it is possible to generate an emotional reaction, as part of a desired state
of mind, by calling up events and images, real or imagined. 3 Think, for example, of
setting out on a visit to see a friend who has been unwell. It is a visit during a busy
work week filled with some minor but unexpected letdowns and sleepless nights with
a teething toddler. Think of how you might take a moment before that visit to hold
your friend in your thoughts, call up certain memories, and consider the difficulties
that she is facing to put yourself in a good position to be genuinely loving and
attentive during your time together. This is an example of emotions fulfilling a service
function, and, so too, the conscientious and imaginative, and image-laden work that
is required to call up the appropriate emotional state for the task at hand. Though
this example is set within the confines of a friendship, the dynamic works similarly in
the context of impersonal relations, a category more relevant to the task of judging. 4
At times this work is ritualized (the donning of robes, the double knotting of cleats,
or the act of kneeling in prayer), with the aim of generating the right emotional frame
for a practice.
The interest here is in the conscientious work required to establish an emotional state
that is motivated by the actor’s desire to act or reason well, and where certain
emotions are understood to be constitutive of the appropriate action or
understanding. This definition sets asides those instances where an actor draws on
an emotion for purely pragmatic reasons (making my toddler laugh in the grocery
store to stave off a tantrum). In short, the focus here is not on the general utility of
an emotion with respect to action but rather on the emotions that form part of the
application of a value. 5 This is not to say, however, that we don’t find these functions
interwoven. Martha Nussbaum, for example, relies on a combination of pragmatic
and normative reasons when she argues that the pervasiveness of hate, bigotry, and
prejudice demands a conscious application of social emotions in political life
(Nussbaum 2015).
Emotions can serve epistemic functions, allowing us to focus on features of the world
that we consider important or, conversely, to identify threats to those persons,
things, or values that we hold dear. It is often through an emotion that we learn
about the best means by which to act in accordance with a value. It is for this reason,
then, that we sometimes draw on emotions in the service role. Peter Goldie offers an
illuminating example of an agent using the emotion of regret for planning purposes
(Goldie 2009). As Goldie sketches it out, Sally wishes to catch a train to attend a
lecture. Sally wants to have a shower but really doesn’t, for certain, have time to
have one and arrive at the station in time. Imagining how terrible it would feel to
miss the lecture by arriving too late for the train (the emotion of regret) helps Sally
prioritize these desires, dropping the shower to get to the train on time. In this case,
Sally consciously draws on the emotion of regret to test and clarify her priorities, and
then act upon them. She puts the emotion of regret to use in her reasoning processes
In the Gorgias, Plato argues that logoi (discourse, speech acts) have the power to “stop fear and take
away grief and engender joy and increase fellow feeling,” cited also in Nussbaum 1996.
4
There is a parallel here with some of the sociological research on “emotion work”, which has focused on
those, usually gendered, fields of employment (airline stewardess, nurses etc.) which requires workers to
manage the emotions of clients. (Hochschild 1983).
5
The argument here is that emotions are epiphenomenal to the structure of the legal value of human
dignity. Their appropriateness derives from the nature and structure of the legal value (which is not to say
that there is agreement on the nature and structure of this value). The characterization of emotions as
derivative of a wrong (or a value) in this sense does not diminish their role. He writes: “A derivative role
in the relevant sense might well be a major role, even the dominant role” (Gardner 2016).
3
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to act in accordance with her values. The point here is the aim of the paper - we, at
times, consciously use examples, historical or imagined, because we know that they
evoke emotions which facilitate our ability to act or reason well (in accordance with
a role, or value).
Emotions fulfill a service role when we draw on them to generate the right quality of
mind to act well – that is, when we consciously place ourselves in a position to
experience an emotion because we understand it to be in line with a value-directed
practice (Williams 1973, Scheffler 1991). When we draw on a particular emotion in
the service of a value, there might be corollary epistemic or pragmatic benefits. While
these are at times termed, “service emotions” in the paper, they are really emotions
that are fulfilling a service role (a necessary specification as individual emotions can
function in various roles (see White 2014).
3. Judicial Emotions and Rights Violations
Judges determine the ambit of a constitutional right in the context of an alleged
violation. This work requires the right affective understanding of both a rights
guarantee, and the harm or wrong of its violation, which are both distinct from the
emotional reactions of judges to the evidence in the case at hand. Generating and
maintaining the right affective understanding of the idea of a rights violation requires
a series of mental efforts that are aided by emotions operating in the service role.
Set within the scaffolding of legal doctrine and precedent, this is a backwards-looking,
example-driven exercise that aims to generate and maintain a somber and negative
emotional dimension to the conceptual category of a rights violation. The adjudication
of constitutional rights requires judges to consciously draw on a series of affectively
charged examples drawn from precedent or legislative history, which cultivate a
series of solemn emotions like lament, rue, and indignation. These are steadying,
reflective emotions that are called up by judges through a familiar set of legal
reasoning techniques in order to infuse an inquiry into an alleged rights violation with
the requisite weight and solemnity. This section proceeds in two parts. First, it
describes the role of service emotions in judicial understandings of a rights violation.
Second, it examines the epistemic value of painful emotions in legal reasoning about
a potential rights violation.
3.1. Constructing the Legal Category of a Rights Violation
Emotions can be appropriate to a role or task. Emotions fulfilling service roles enable
judges to generate and maintain the affective understanding of a rights violation
required by the governing legal values and doctrine of a constitutional order. A rights
violation must be understood as a harm or wrong, and this understanding would be
incomplete without emotions. For judges, negative emotions should arise when
confronted with the idea of a constitutional rights violation, and they should grow
more acute, specific, and painful even, in the face of particular examples (should
cynicism or burnout dull these emotions, then we might charge that judges are not
applying the doctrine as they are required to do, i.e., they are not giving full
protection to the constitutional guarantee in question). The source of the obligation
to build this negative emotional sense into the category of a rights violation stems
from a governing legal scheme (and a constitutional rights violation always
represents a threat to political authority where this is premised on governmental
powers being limited by constitutional rights). Whether the lament, somberness,
and/or painful recognition that a judge is required to experience when reasoning
through a constitutional case tracks a freestanding or all-things-considered ethical or
political obligation is a powerful question that should be posed vis-à-vis any legal
system, though it is left here unaddressed. 6

6
Whether the affective dimensions of the category of a rights violation are seen as constitutive or
epiphenomenal might depend on your theory of judicial interpretation.
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Not all legal wrongs require judges to experience emotions and we can imagine
several examples where judges have to do very little emotional work to properly
understand the legal concepts that must be applied in the case at hand (certain legal
categories, like sexual assault, or false imprisonment, would appear to have a strong
negative emotional imports, while others, like a noise violation, or a contract breach
appear less clearly to possess the same). This is not the case with respect to an
alleged violation of a constitutional right. A judge conceiving of a rights violation
neutrally, without any trace of lament, painful affect, or solemnity, would appear not
to be grasping the positive sense of the rights guarantee (though the intensity of the
expected emotional response might depend somewhat on how broadly the ambit of
the right has been drawn, and whether or not the rights violation is ultimately subject
to proportionality or justificatory reasoning), and the specific harm or wrong of an
interference with those rights. Judges are called upon to apply general values,
concepts, and categories to particular cases (Dworkin 1977, MacCormick 1978).
Emotions play a role in crafting judicial understandings of the general category of a
constitutional rights violation. This emotional layering can be distinguished from the
claimant’s own subjective experience of an allegedly rights-violating law or
government act. 7 It is also likely to be particular to the right in question, whether it
be one that provides a guarantee of equality under the law, or a protection against
certain kinds of deprivations of life, liberty, and security of the person.
While this is an analytical argument about what legal reasoning requires of emotion,
we can nevertheless detect traces of this mechanism at work in the text of
judgements where constitutional rights protections are introduced via evocative
descriptions of precedent and legislative history (see McCrudden 2015). Such
references work to guide judicial understandings of the nature and purposes of the
constitutional right in question, and emotions play a role in layering and deepening
that understanding. To analyze a potential rights violation in common law reasoning,
judges consider past precedent where the constitutional right in question had been
violated in purposes or effect. At times, judgements will refer back to the social ills
or political wrongs that occurred prior to the recognition of the constitutional right in
question. 8 Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has written
that judges interpret constitutional rights taking into account both the constitutional
or human rights architecture of a specific political community as well a political
community’s specific historical and social background that led to the recognition of
certain constitutional rights within that legal–political order. Understanding how a
history of political violence bears on the idea of a constitutional guarantee is far from
a neutral task. Insofar that the legal concept of dignity is frequently used to interpret
constitutional rights (McCrudden 2008, 2013, Waldron 2012a), judges often turn to
historical examples of dignity violations as part of their rights analysis. Writing on the
uses of the past to interpret the legal concept of human dignity, Peggy Cooper Davis
writes,
Since World War II, as international rights codifications have proliferated, use of the
term human rights has become more common in legal discourse and is now
commonly associated with the concept of human dignity. In this same post World
War II period, the concept of human dignity has come to carry new associations:
those who drafted new constitutions in response to acts and political arrangements
that were widely regarded as atrocities identified respect for human dignity as the
principle those atrocities had violated. Most notably, Germany after the Holocaust
and South Africa after apartheid built new constitutions with cornerstones of respect
for human dignity. This, I argue, was a key development toward understanding
human dignity through protest against its denial. (Davis 2016)
7
There are a number of reasons that individual claimants might not experience a rights violation under
law as painful or not wish to frame a rights claim before the court in such a manner. At times, we wish to
stand on our rights. (See Williams 1992, Waldron 2013).
8
See, for example, the early decision of the South African Constitutional Court in State v Makwanyane
and Another [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), [1996] 2 CHRLD 164, 1995
(2) SACR 1 (CC).

Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 9, n. 5 (2019), 577-595
ISSN: 2079-5971

585

Emily Kidd White

Replaying the Past: Roles for Emotion…

Jeremy Waldron, in a similar vein, highlights the connection between judicial
interpretations of human dignity and a series of historical periods where the laws
within a particular political community did not recognize the equal humanity of
persons. He writes, “every country has to cope with the burden of its own history,
with vestiges of its commitment to an ideology of differential dignity. Think of the
United States, for example, burdened by a history of slavery and institutionalized
racism” (Waldron 2012a). Reacting to these histories of dignity violations without an
emotional response would signify something like an incomplete understanding (see
Solomon 1977b, de Sousa 1987, 2011) of the rights secured by the constitution.
When the law requires a judge to reason in accordance with a value, they must be
sensitive and responsive to value threats. It is a feature of holding a value that we
respond with emotion to real or imagined examples of that value being undermined
or impeded (Stocker 1996).
Certain emotions appear constitutive, or epiphenomenal perhaps, to the idea of
injustice (particular candidates here might include: lament, rue, pity, concern,
anguish, solemnity, outrage and/or indignation). Conversely, concepts of injustice
might themselves bear a unique and distinctive (however unnamed) emotional aspect
(see White forthcoming). The relevant emotions concerning injustice are called up by
judges using a familiar set of common-law reasoning techniques (see Del Mar 2013,
2018) which include references to precedent and legislative history. Often powerful
phrases are repeated time and again through judgments, nearly as recantations, with
the aim of establishing a more robust and tone-filled understanding of the
constitutional right in question. Referring to past rights violations via precedent or
legislative history bring front-of-mind a series of affectively-charged images and
examples which work to both establish and hold the meaning of the constitutional
right in question, and to set the right frame of mind for reasoning through the case
at hand. These are familiar legal reasoning techniques used by judges of all levels of
court. Judges regularly look to past uses to establish the meaning and veracity of a
legal concept prior to its application to the case at hand. As mentioned, this generally
consists of references to precedent and legislative history, but it can extend more
broadly to include historical examples of violence and/or widescale, paradigmatic
violations of rights (or the emblematic, seared-into-the-memory-of-a-group
particularized instance of a broader political injustice, Michael Brown in Ferguson, for
example (see Jackson 2016, Blum 2017) as we see with references to apartheid in
the South African jurisprudence, for example, and with references to National
Fascism and the Holocaust in the German constitutional jurisprudence (Habermas
2010, Scott 2013, Tasioulas 2013). As Aharon Barak has argued, judicial
interpretations of constitutional rights draw upon both the constitutional architecture
of a particular jurisdiction and broader historical and sociological understandings of
the sorts of wrongs and harms that constitutional guarantees aim to prevent (Barak
2015).
Through these reasoning techniques, the emotions that relate to injustice are raised,
offering form, grip, and salience to the idea of a rights violation. These emotions work
to lend seriousness and gravity to the inquiry at hand. They also potentially offer an
important sense of humility to judicial reasoning efforts, as they invariably highlight
the past failures of judges to overturn laws that perpetuated indignity, and/or
violated constitutional rights.
One way of clearly demarcating the service role for emotions in legal reasoning is to
point to the section of the legal judgment where we might expect the emotions to
function in this role. Common-law judgments 9 generally share the same elements
and basic structure: a statement of facts, lower court findings (where applicable),
the governing law, the position of the parties, the application of the law to the legal
issues presented, the decision, and the remedy. The relevant section of the judgment
is, then, the governing law section. Here we are concerned with the ways in which
9

Civil law judgments contain similar elements (Waldron 2012b).
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emotions work to set up thinking about the general category of a constitutional rights
violation, and the role that emotions play in the legal reasoning techniques that
concretize the constitutional right in question. Affectively laden examples play a role
in establishing judicial understandings of the purposes and purview of the right in
question, and so too in the stakes of its violation.
Service emotions here contribute an additional layer of meaning to the concept by
lending structure, and often a sense of importance and clarity, to judicial
understandings of rights protections. This function reflects the notion of “thickening”,
which draws upon the thin/thick distinction in ethical theory (Dworkin 1972, Williams
1985, Scheffler 1987, Waldron 2010b). Thin concepts operate at a higher level of
abstraction than thick ones. For example, the concept of betrayal is thicker and
includes more detail than the concept of wrongness. According to this distinction,
thick concepts “are said to have both evaluative conceptual content, for they seem
to be keyed in to approval (or disapproval), and descriptive content, for they help to
give us a specific idea of the character of the person, object, or action, so
characterized” (Kirchin 2013). By contrast, “thin concepts, although clearly
evaluative, are thought not to have much or any descriptive conceptual content: we
get little if any sense of what the object is like beyond the fact that the user likes (or
dislikes) it, thinks others should do the same, and so on” (ibid.). Examples of thin
evaluative concepts are “good”, “bad”, and “right”. Such concepts are “very abstract
vehicles of commendation or disparagement that can be attached to an almost
unlimited range of actions or states of affairs” (Kirchin 2013). Thick concepts are
specific, as opposed to general, evaluative ones. “Gentleness”, “cruelty”, and
“patience” are examples.
Emotions, such as those that respond to an injustice, can also be thick – that is, they
contain evaluative judgements, and tend to be rich in detail and tone (see King 2007).
Similar to thick concepts, thick emotions bind together judgments, affect, dominant
metaphors, scripts, and desires (Solomon 1977a). Reactions of pain and horror to
the ill treatment of others can strike us, and hold us, and provoke in us a recognition
and understanding of the rights-violating form of a law or practice. Here, however,
the task is to build in an emotional understanding of a particular constitutional rights
guarantee by referencing a history of violation within the political community (or,
more broadly, across political communities). Peggy Cooper Davis puts the argument
powerfully here:
The concept of respect for human dignity has, I think, been best understood in the
process of contemplating its lack. Certain constraints on people and certain ways of
relating to people strike us as deeply inconsistent or dissonant with the respect they
are due. We then reason back to discover what causes our sense of dissonance. When
we contemplate physical abuse or the taking of human life, our sense of dissonance
may reflect identification and faith that our own kind is precious. And identification
may encompass a communal feeling such that the pain or death of one is felt as a
direct loss to all. (Davis 2009)

Take, for further example, the Obergefell v Hodges, _ 576 US (2015), case before
the United States Supreme Court that found that the right to marriage for same-sex
couples was protected under the Due Process Clause and the 14th Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. Dignity plays a unique role in American constitutional law
and historically has referred to institutional or corporate, not human, dignity (Daly
2012). In Obergefell, however, it is the legal value of human dignity that plays an
important role. The value is constructed through references to its erasure under
American law, and it is through a reference to this history that the Court builds a
powerful emotive sense of the category of a dignity violation. The Court uses the
usual dictates of legal reasoning to build meaning into the concept. 10 The Court
emphasizes, in the passages included below, how the commitment to equal dignity
between persons had been systematically violated through law, using the examples
10

For a lovely related piece on exemplarity and narrativity in legal reasoning, see Del Mar 2013.
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of the doctrine of coverture, the legal ban on interracial marriage, and the
criminalization of same-sex relations.
Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were
treated by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. See 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 430 (1765). As women gained legal, political,
and property rights, and as society began to understand that women have their own
equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned (…).
Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned as immoral
by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief often embodied in the criminal
law. For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem homosexuals to have
dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by same-sex couples of
what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken. Even when a greater awareness of
the humanity and integrity of homosexual persons came in the period after World
War II, the argument that gays and lesbians had a just claim to dignity was in conflict
with both law and widespread social conventions (…).
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. To take
but one period, this occurred with respect to marriage in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Notwithstanding the gradual erosion of the doctrine of coverture…invidious sex-based
classifications in marriage remained common through the mid-20th century. See App.
to Brief for Appellant in Reed v Reed, O. T. 1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive
reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as unequal to men in marriage).
These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. One State’s law,
for example, provided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family and the
wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so
far as the law recognizes her separately, either for her own protection, or for her
benefit” Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935)…
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. [Obergefell et al. v Hodges, Director,
Ohio Department of Health, et al. _ 576 US (2015)]

In short, precedents build up a sense of the stakes of the category of a rights
violation. As Obergefell shows, the Equal Protection Clause is given history, density,
and meaning through the invocation of precedent. Part of this process is building a
powerful and painful emotional resonance into the category of violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The right is understood through emotionally laden references to
its historical denial.
3.2. Drawing on the Epistemic Advantages of Painful Emotions
Imagination, love, intellect – and pain.
Yes, you’ve got to know pain.
John Berryman 11, 2016

To recall an earlier definition, emotions have either a positive or negative orientation
(Gardner 2008). As we saw above, the relevant emotional sense of a constitutional
rights violation possesses a negative orientation – a painful orientation. At times,
painful emotions serve epistemic functions, aiding our understanding of the situation
we are confronting (Elgin 2007, Brady 2013). Pain can, in this way, be clarifying, just
as anger can be a form of right-seeing (Srinivasan 2017). Functioning in a service
role, painful emotions can flag threats to a constitutional right that might not have
been otherwise recognized. All emotions have a built-in desire, and painful emotions
have a built-in desire to locate the source of the pain (Solomon 1977b). Pain
facilitates interest and attention. As the negative painful sense is concerned with the
unjust treatment of others, it is bound up with solemnity, vigilance, and concern. We
might also think that it breeds a healthy skepticism of law based on an awareness of
past violations, even widespread systemic violations, of constitutional rights. The
11

John Berryman answering the question of what makes a poet in Cole 2016.
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feeling of pain has a capacity to motivate. This supports the interpretive role assigned
to the legal value of human dignity places in constitutional regimes committed to the
purposive interpretation of constitutional rights. 12 This has the potential to place the
judge in a state of agitation motivating a careful exploration of the evidence of an
alleged rights infringement. Pain denotes concern and underscores a value
commitment (emotions are in this way eudemonistic). The emotions of injustice are
sensibility training emotions, 13 they focus their holder’s attention on an event that
bears a particular sort of significance. In this way, they motivate the search for
unrecognized instances of a rights violation.
The emotions of injustice functioning in the service role can work to place an
additional cognitive emphasis on the efforts to recognize certain kinds of wrong or
harm, breeding a serious and solemn sort of attention to the evidence of an alleged
rights violation in the case at hand. The emotions of injustice work to establish the
stakes of the constitutional question before the court. This is an important rebuttal
to the charge that a recognition of the role of emotions in judicial reasoning somehow
sets up a high bar for plaintiffs to generate spectacle in their presentation of their
case to the court. 14 It is also an important guard against complacency, cynicism, or
worse. Nussbaum instructs that, given the pervasiveness of hate, stereotype, and
prejudice, we consciously must draw on social emotions to counter their effects
(Nussbaum 2015). Judicial commitments to neutrality cannot encompass a neutral
understanding of past rights violations. A judge that felt nothing with respect to them
would not simply be failing an ethical or political test (should the particulars demand
this) but would be erring in understanding the constitutional guarantee, and hence
in their efforts at legal reasoning. Time and time again we see judges draw on the
emotions related to indignity and injustice (indignation, outrage, woe, pity,
solemnity) register in their dissenting opinions (Maroney 2011) – or in majority
opinions that disavow earlier dignity-violating laws. Legislators arguing for legal
change and protest movements and community organizers know this emotional
register well (see Waldron 2016).
As history has shown us, constitutional laws have systematically violated their own
commitments (to equal protection, or to an equal recognition of dignity, for example),
and these instances or patterns have not always been recognized by judges. Service
emotions thicken judicial understandings of the right in question such that judges
should feel the pressure of the charge of their alleged infringement. A judge training
her eye on the painful category of a rights infringement should be open to an
imaginative searching and attention to other sorts of harms that are analogous to
those previously recognized as a violation of the right in question. Notice that a
painful emotion can be painful without being excruciating, or halting; the appropriate
pain is motivating in the sense that it aims to detect each of the relevant violations
of a constitutional right.

12
South Africa and Canada are both examples of legal regimes committed to the purposive and contextsensitive interpretations of constitutional rights (see O'Connell 2008, White 2017). Related here is Peggy
Cooper Davis’ proposal for a “responsive constitutionalism” approach to interpretation in the United States
to confront the history of law-constructed and -sanctioned racial injustice (Davis 2009).
13
Jeremy Waldron offers an illuminating example in his book Torture, Terror and Tradeoffs, in a discussion
on the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects against cruel and unusual
punishment. Waldron pushes the question of why we use the concept of cruelty – itself a broad, inchoate
legal value – in lieu of a list of interrogation techniques that should be outlawed. It is because we want to
include all relevant instances of cruelty and not encourage a technical innovation in punishment techniques
to evade an enumerated list (Waldron 2010a).
14
Ensuring that judges are attentive, solemn, and meaningfully aware of historical examples of dignity
violations ensures that claimants don’t need to put in additional effort to elicit that sort of attention and
concern from the judges. It should belong to them already under a constitutional rights system committed
to the dignity value. “Plot, not spectacle” as Aristotle put it in his Poetics.
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4. Conclusion
After great pain, a formal feeling comes –
Emily Dickinson (with R.W. Franklin, ed.), The Poems of Emily Dickinson, 1999

This paper set as its task an examination of the way in which a set of service emotions
proves integral to judicial reasoning in the context of an alleged violation of a
constitutional right. Here the focus is on the conscious cultivation and use of certain
emotions that are part of legal reasoning in the adjudication of a constitutional right.
Judicial understandings of constitutional rights are regularly sharpened by reference
to past violations. At times, this involves the conscious retrieval of a series of
emotions related to injustice to provide a richer understanding of the category of a
rights violation. Constitutional rights are regularly introduced in a judgment via a line
of precedents of significant emotional import and alongside references to symbolic
historical events (McCrudden 2013). These are ways of loading the term with
meaning, generating the appropriate mindset, for the purpose of determining
whether the right in question had been violated in the case at hand.
The dictates of legal reasoning are established by governing law (though questions
of interpretation remain), and where there are governing legal values, there will be
emotions that form part of the use of those values. Judges can err in their use of
emotions not only by drawing on extraneous ones, but also by using the appropriate
ones in the wrong sorts of ways, or at the wrong magnitude. 15 The paper does not
propose emotions as a panacea. A legal system that requires judges to draw upon
some emotions in their interpretations of constitutional rights may serve as a
corrective against excessive formalism and might, as this paper argues in part, call
attention to previously unseen and unrecognized rights violations. Emotions are not,
however, an apolitical phenomenon. Emotions can serve both progressive and
pernicious political ends. Significantly, none of the foregoing amounts to a defense
of existing legal orders, as much will turn on the political quality of the choice and
description of the historical rights violations folded into the legal judgement, and/or
the normative and political status of the legal system in question. Some emotions
might possess a structure that renders salient certain physical and visceral
presentations of human suffering while overlooking long-running and difficult-todetect structural injustices. Judicial commitments to neutrality are insufficient to
establish the quality of mind required to adjudicate constitutional rights in the context
of their alleged violation. As history has shown us, laws have systematically violated
their own constitutional guarantees of rights in ways that have not always been
readily identified by judges.
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